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Giving the Expectancy-Value Model a Heart1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, research in consumer behavior has debated the role of emotion in 
consumer decision making intensively but has offered few attempts to integrate emotion-related 
findings with established theoretical frameworks. This manuscript augments the classical 
expectancy-value model of attitude with a dimensional model of emotion. An experiment 
involving 308 college students who face actual purchase decisions shows that predictions of 
attitudes, behavioral intentions and actual behavior can be improved through the use of the 
augmented model for both hedonic and utilitarian products. The augmented model has 
theoretical implications for marketing scholars as well as practical uses for marketers.  
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  The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this title. The authors would 




Giving the Expectancy-Value Model a Heart 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since its inception, the “information processing view” has been the predominant paradigm 
of consumer behavior research (Bagozzi, Gürhan-Canli, & Priester, 2002). This paradigm mainly 
regards consumers as logical problem solvers and “thinking machines” (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999, p. 
290). Prominent researchers now increasingly contend that the information processing paradigm 
paints an incomplete picture of consumer decision making. Although it can explain and predict 
the consumption of functional, utilitarian goods, its adequacy for hedonic consumption 
decisions, in which “less experience is available, where the problem is not well-structured, and 
where emotional reactions are important” (Phillips, Olsen, & Baumgartner, 1995, p. 284), appears 
questionable.  
In turn, the role of affect2 has become a central research topic in consumer research in the 
past decade (Cohen, Pham, & Andrade, 2008). However, the proliferation of research on 
seemingly contextual affective influences on behavior and the limited integration of new 
findings into established information processing frameworks have led to growing concerns 
among decision-making researchers. Such concerns have prompted questions such as the one 
cited by Schwarz (2006, p. 20): “Whatever happened to Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of rational 
behavior and other such models? All we hear about from psychologists these days is how funny 
little things make people feel one way or another, influencing what they like and do.” 
                                                 
2
  Regarding the terms affect, emotion, and mood, which are often used interchangeably, the authors follow the 
definitions offered by Ekman and Davidson (1994), according to which affect is an umbrella concept that 
encompasses both emotions and moods. Moods are longer lasting, less intense, and less directly coupled with action 
tendencies than are emotions; emotions typically are intentional (meaning that they have a specific referent object) 
whereas moods are generally non-intentional, global, and diffuse. 
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This research attempts to address such concern by assessing the compatibility of the 
flourishing emotion research stream with cognitively dominated attitude-theory decision making 
models. The manuscript begins with a theoretical discussion of whether Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) 
expectancy-value model (EVM) of attitude is sufficient to capture the influence of emotion on 
decision making. Then, the EVM is augmented with anticipatory emotions and emotional 
expectation constructs (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2000), drawing on Larsen and 
Diener’s (1992) circumplex model of emotion. With a controlled experiment involving 308 college 
students faced with actual purchase decisions, the authors test whether the augmented EVM 
performs better than the traditional EVM in predicting overall evaluations and attitudes, purchase 
intentions, and actual behavior, using a series of multistage linear and logistic regressions. To test 
Philips and colleagues’ (1995) proposition that the traditional model is sufficient for utilitarian but 
not hedonic consumption contexts, the analysis is performed for both consumption categories. 
Finally, the results are discussed and implications for researchers and marketing practitioners are 
offered. 
THE LINK BETWEEN THE EXPECTANCY-VALUE MODEL AND EMOTION IN 
EXTANT RESEACH 
The Influence of the Expectancy-Value Model 
Using economic theories of rationality and utility as a foundation, Edwards (1954) introduced 
expectancy-value models to psychological literature. According to his theory of subjective expected 
utility, the likelihood of an event’s occurrence when an action is taken is the subjective probability 
SP of an outcome, and the desirability of this outcome is its subjective utility U. The product of 
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4 
 
In the realm of social psychology, Fishbein (1967) adapted this expectancy-value model to 
form the backbone of his theory of reasoned action. In Fishbein’s variant - today considered “the 
most widely applied representation of attitude across many disciplines” (Bagozzi et al., 2002, p. 7) - 
beliefs bi about the probability of the presence of attributes in an object get multiplied with 
evaluations ei of these attributes. This formulation of attitude forms the theoretical basis for more 
than 150 studies relying on the theory of reasoned action or the theory of planned behavior 
published in EBSCOhost Business/Economics database, and more than 830 in the PsycINFO and 
Medline databases (Francis et al., 2004). In studies of consumer behavior, bi often is replaced with 
wi, or the importance weight of the attribute (the so-called adequacy-importance formulation of the 
EVM), because a consumer often knows with certainty whether an attribute is present or absent in a 
decision object (Mazis, Ahtola, & Klippel, 1975). The product of belief bi (or importance wi) and 
evaluation ei then can be summed over n attributes to determine global attitude toward the object 
Aobj. In turn, Aobj determines the intention to act, which, according to EVM, should trigger the 




A b e  
EVM and Measures of Emotion 
One of the main criticisms directed at the EVM by emotion researchers is its conceptualization of 
evaluation ei. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975, p. 11) use the terms “evaluation” and “affect” 
synonymously, arguing that no reliable empirical distinction can be made between a person’s 
judgment that an object makes him or her feel good and the evaluation that the object is good. Their 
assessment derives from earlier observations that failed to establish discriminant validity among the 
cognitive, affective, and conative components of the classic tripartite model of attitude (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 2005), which may have been due “to a failure to adequately differentiate between 
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evaluative measures […] and antecedent or subsequent processes, which might be feeling-based” 
(Cohen et al., 2008, p. 297).  
In response, the “experiential view” of consumer behavior was put forward in two seminal 
papers (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982; Holbrook & Hirschman, 1982). The experiential view 
contrasted attribute beliefs/knowledge with fantasies/daydreams, tangible/objective benefits with 
symbolic/subjective ones, attitudes with emotions, and utility with aesthetic value. Like the 
information processing view, the experiential view was not developed as a testable, mathematical 
model, but rather as an encompassing perspective of consumer behavior. It suggested that the 
information processing view was adequate for studying utilitarian consumption contexts, but that 
affective responses had to be accounted for when studying hedonic consumption contexts. Likewise, 
in the realm of testable models, Phillips and colleagues (1995) stressed that multi-attribute 
expectancy-value models had been successful in capturing utilitarian consumer decisions, but could 
not account for hedonic consumer decision making. Nonetheless, Holbrook and Hirschman (1982, p. 
138) cautioned that “abandoning the information processing approach is undesirable, but 
supplementing and enriching it with an admixture of the experiential perspective could be extremely 
fruitful.”  
Hence, as theories of emotion have become more fine-grained and measurement methods 
advanced, several studies have empirically demonstrated the discriminant validity between 
evaluations and affect (Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Bodur, 
Brinberg & Coupey, 2000), and several theoretical arguments distinguish affect and evaluation. 
These arguments broadly can be grouped into four main categories: conceptual breadth, possibility 
versus probability, dynamic appraisals versus static predispositions, and temporal focus. These 




 Conceptual breadth. Affect encompasses the entire spectrum of human moods and emotions, 
whereas evaluative liking or disliking is widely considered just a tiny subset of this broad 
spectrum (Allen, Machleit, & Kleine, 1992). 
 Possibility versus probability. Whereas affect is sensitive to mere possibility and can 
influence intentions, even when the probability of an outcome is nearly zero, attitudes 
usually are conceptualized as a direct function of probability and thus are very weak when 
the probability is close to zero (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; MacInnis & de 
Mello, 2005).  
 Dynamic appraisals versus static predispositions. Attitudinal evaluations are defined as a 
consumer’s learned static predispositions that are activated when the consumer is confronted 
with the stimulus object. Emotional reactions depend instead on context-sensitive dynamic 
appraisals (Bagozzi et al., 2003). 
 Temporal focus. Whereas attribute evaluations are traditionally measured as pre-consumption 
judgments, affective reactions include the consumer’s actual and expected emotions before, 
during, and after consumption (Bagozzi, Dholakia, & Basuroy, 2000; Richard et al., 1996).  
The Role of Emotions for Attitude and Behavior 
While emotions and evaluation can be theoretically (and empirically) distinguished, as shown 
above, there is considerable debate about how emotions affect consumers’ decision making—
by functioning as an antecedent of attitude, by influencing behavior in addition to attitudes, or 
by both.   
Regarding emotions as attitude antecedents, Cohen and colleagues (2008, p. 309) perceive 
an emerging consensus that emotions are “one of several potential antecedents or determinants of 
overall evaluation or attitude.” Early evidence for this position was provided by Breckler and 
Wiggins (1989), who showed in the context of blood donations that evaluations and emotions, as 
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measured by Izard’s (1972) differential emotion scale (DES), are distinguishable components of 
overall attitude. Kempf (1999) studied the effects of two emotion dimensions (pleasure and arousal) 
and expectancy-value (measured as the product of attribute evaluations, attribute beliefs, and belief 
confidence) on product trial evaluations for a computer game and grammar checker software. Her 
results suggest that pleasure and arousal are antecedents of Aobj for hedonic products, whereas 
expectancy-value is not. Conversely, pleasure and expectancy-value are antecedents of Aobj for 
utilitarian products, whereas arousal is not. Bodur et al. (2000) showed that affect, as measured by 
arousal, elation, pleasantness and distress constructs, has a direct effect on attitudes towards risky 
behaviors. More recently, Kulviwat et al. (2007) tested whether the Technology Acceptance Model 
– an adaptation of the theory of reasoned action – could be improved by augmenting it with a 
dimensional model of emotion, namely Mehrabian and Russell’s (1974) Pleasure-Arousal-
Dominance paradigm. The authors found that the prediction of technology adoption attitudes and 
intentions could be significantly improved by accounting for affect.  
A related stream of research on persuasion and the elaboration likelihood model has 
emphasized the role of affect as a significant antecedent of attitude, moderated by message 
elaboration and involvement (e.g. Batra & Stayman, 1990; Petty, Schumann, Richman, & 
Strathman, 1993; Petty & Caccioppo, 1986). In particular, Mano (1997) found evidence for indirect 
effects of the pleasure and arousal emotion dimensions on Aobj (mediated by elaboration and thought 
positivity) as well as direct effects of pleasure on Aobj in one experimental condition.  
Regarding the effect of emotions on behavior, human emotions appear to have evolved 
as drivers of behavior because of their approach/avoidance function (for a review, see Ekman & 
Davidson, 1994)—positive emotions impel the person experiencing them to approach the emotions’ 
referent object, whereas negative emotions elicit avoidant behavior. However, it is unclear whether 
this effect exists above and beyond the effect of attitude. Again in the context of blood donations 
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and employing the DES as a measure of emotion, Allen and colleagues (1992) demonstrated that 
emotions can have a direct effect on behavior, not explained by attitudes. They limit their study to 
behaviors for which previous experiences were not freely chosen. Richard and colleagues (1996) 
empirically showed that attitudes and emotional expectations have parallel effects on behavioral 
intentions for four different behaviors (i.e., eating junk food, using soft drugs, drinking alcohol, and 
studying), but measure both attitudes and emotions with the same three semantic differential 
measures. Most recently, Perugini and Bagozzi (2001) have augmented the theory of planned 
behavior with desires, frequency, and recency of past behavior, as well as a selection (not explained 
theoretically) of positive and negative anticipated emotions added as independent variables for two 
utilitarian behaviors (bodyweight regulation and studying). They find that the variance explanation 
of intentions and behavior increases significantly when they include emotion constructs.  
This research builds on these findings and extends them. It is the first study which 
comprehensively tests the influence of emotion on attitude formation, intention formation, and 
behavior, and systematically analyzes potential differences between hedonic and utilitarian 
behaviors, extending knowledge of how emotions affect consumers’ decision making. This 
research aims to overcome limitations inherent with the studies listed above, such as the 
conceptualization of attitude as a global “good/bad”-type evaluation instead of attribute-level 
measurements3. Foregoing attribute-level measurements makes it nearly impossible to differentiate 
between the effects of cognitive evaluation versus emotion on the formation of attitudes, intentions, 
and actual behavior. The authors also account for the recently suggested distinction between 
“anticipatory emotions” and “emotional expectations” (also termed “anticipated emotions”; Cohen 
et al., 2008) in the decision-making process.   
                                                 
3
  A noteworthy exception is the study by Kempf (1999). 
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AUGMENTING THE EXPECTANCY-VALUE MODEL: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
To augment the EVM with measures of affect, this research draws on Larsen and Diener’s (1992) 
circumplex model of emotion. The circumplex model groups emotions into two bipolar dimensions 
based on empirical associations: pleasant versus unpleasant affect and high activation versus low 
activation. Dimensional models of emotions such as this one have been criticized because they do 
not provide any insights into the conditions that give rise to the different emotion states, in contrast 
with appraisal theory models that conceptualize emotions as discrete entities and explain their 
genesis (for an overview, see Bagozzi et al., 2000). However, this research is concerned not with the 
antecedents of emotions but rather their consequences in the decision making process, so 
dimensional models are adequate due to their parsimony and intuitiveness (Bagozzi, Gopinath, & 
Nyer, 1999). Kulviwat et al. (2007) also cite parsimony as their main reason for choosing a 
dimensional model of emotion for augmenting the Technology Acceptance Model. 
Traditionally, dimensional models of emotion such as Larsen and Diener’s (1992), the 
PA/NA model by Watson & Tellegen (1985; “PA/NA”), or the PAD paradigm employed by 
Kulviwat et al. (2007) rely on just two or three bipolar dimensions anchored in phenomenologically 
opposing emotions, e.g. “elated/euphoric” on one end of the scale and “dull/drowsy” on the other 
end. This implies that these emotions are conceptualized as perfectly mutually exclusive. However, 
recent research has shown that consumers can experience different emotions at the same time, a 
phenomenon referred to as “mixed emotions” (e.g., Aaker, Drolet, & Griffin, 2008). To account for 
such non-exclusiveness of pleasant and unpleasant affect, four unipolar emotion constructs listed in 
Table 1 are conceptualized, instead of using two bipolar dimensions. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Bagozzi and colleagues (2000) also stress that currently experienced and future emotions 
should be differentiated in consumer decision making. Consumers’ a priori experience of emotions 
felt during or after a future event, brought about by their mental simulation of these events, has been 
termed anticipated emotions, affective expectations, affective forecasts, or how-do-I-feel-about-it 
heuristics (e.g., Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Pham, 1988; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). Yet 
Bagozzi and colleagues (2000, p. 50) assert that “little is known [especially] about positive 
anticipated emotions, even though it is likely that many consumer behaviors are the result of, say, 
the anticipation of future joy.”  
Scholars also have debated whether anticipated emotions are genuinely experienced in the 
present, when the expectation about the future is formed, or whether they are mere cognitive 
predictions about future emotional states. Mellers and colleagues (1999) find for the former, 
whereas Bagozzi and colleagues (2000) declare the point an open research question. Cohen and 
colleagues (2008) consider both possibilities equally valid and make a theoretical distinction 
between “anticipatory emotions” (i.e., currently experienced emotions that result from mental 
simulations of future events) and “anticipated emotions” (i.e., mere cognitive beliefs about future 
emotional states). The latter have also been termed “emotional expectations” (Neelamegham & Jain, 
1999). 
If anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations can indeed be distinguished 
empirically, they may also exhibit differential effects on the different stages of decision-
making. For example, both anticipatory emotions and Aobj are conceptually anchored in the 
present: Anticipatory emotions are what the consumer is currently experiencing, and Aobj 
measures his current evaluation of an object. Emotional expectations and behavioral intentions, 
on the other hand, are expectations of future emotions and behavior. In terms of the 
Expectancy-Value Model, anticipatory emotions may therefore have a stronger influence on 
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Aobj than emotional expectations do, while emotional expectations may have a stronger 
influence on behavioral intentions than anticipatory emotions do. Following this logic, 
conceptual differences between the evaluation component of attitudes and emotions, and the effect 
of emotions on consumer decision making, as demonstrated in the emotions literature, it is argued 
that adding emotions to the expectancy-value model may increase the variance explanation 
associated with the model’s established outcomes, namely, attitudes, purchase intentions, and 
actual purchases. Kulvivat et al.’s (2007) findings when adding emotions to the Technology 
Acceptance Model further strengthen this hypothesis. Formally:  
H1: The variance explanation (a) attitude toward the object, (b) purchase intentions, and (c) 
actual purchases will increase significantly when the EVM includes anticipatory emotion and 
emotional expectation dimensions. 
 
Moreover, it is argued that emotions may become more important in decision making when 
the product is perceived as hedonic as opposed to utilitarian. By definition, hedonic consumption is 
the facet of consumer behavior which relates to “multisensory, fantasy and emotive aspects” of the 
product usage experience (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982, p. 92). When consuming hedonic 
products, consumers pay more attention to the emotional outcome of the consumption episode. In 
certain instances, such as the consumption of movies, the emotional outcome may itself be the goal 
of consumption (Neelamegham & Jain, 1999). Contemplating the consumption of hedonic products 
thus can trigger mood management and mood protection strategies (Caruso & Shafir, 2006).  
A stream of literature on “affect-as-information” has shown that consumers rely on their 
current affective states when making decisions, and that this reliance is moderated by the extent to 
which these affective reactions are believed to have been caused by the target object (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 1988; Schwarz, 2000). This has been termed the “how do I feel 
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about it” or “representativeness” heuristic. Pham (1998) has argued that a second type of 
consideration will determine whether emotional responses are used as information, namely the 
perceived relevance toward the target. In his study, he demonstrates that emotional responses are 
perceived to be more relevant to hedonic consumption motives than to utilitarian consumption 
motives, and are therefore more relied upon in decision making.  
In summary, even when emotional responses are present to a similar extent in both hedonic 
and utilitarian consumption episodes, consumers are more likely to infer that their emotional 
responses have been elicited by the stimulus object itself (rather than by external circumstances) in 
hedonic consumption episodes, and they will perceive these emotions to be more relevant to their 
decision. Thus, it is expected that the impact of emotions on the outcomes of the expectancy-value 
model is greater for products perceived as hedonic than for products perceived as utilitarian:  
H2: The influence of anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations on (a) attitude toward 
the object, (b) purchase intentions, and (c) actual purchases is significantly greater when the 
product is perceived as hedonic rather than utilitarian. 
EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE AUGMENTED EVM MODEL 
To test the EVM model, augmented with emotions, a controlled experiment with motion picture 
DVDs and pocket calculators as experimental stimuli for the hedonic versus utilitarian 
consumption context manipulation was performed. The choice of these stimuli reflects several 
reasons. Both products are multi-attribute offerings, are in the same price range, and are 
common, such that the majority of the population likely has had personal experiences with 
them. 
Many studies which probe the role of emotion in judgment and decision-making 
manipulate affect through film clips (e.g. Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004), stories and 
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introspection about emotional episodes (e.g. Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001), or bogus 
feedback about personal performance (e.g. Forgas & Bower, 2000). The goal of this research, 
however, is not to manipulate emotion directly in such a fashion, but to recreate an actual 
purchasing decision in hedonic and utilitarian consumption contexts. Therefore, product-
generated emotions and evaluations were measured to test whether accounting for emotions 
will improve behavioral prediction within the EVM framework.   
Pretest 
A pretest with 98 students at a German university was conducted with the goal of determining 
the modal salient attributes for the chosen stimuli, that is, the attributes considered by the 
majority of the target population when they form an attitude toward the object. The authors also 
controlled for differences of DVDs versus calculators on the HED/UT scale (Voss, 
Spangenberg, & Grohmann, 2003). The participants completed the online questionnaire, which 
was based on a modified rank-order elicitation technique (Breivik & Supphellen, 2003). The 
questionnaire contained the product images and descriptions of 10 motion picture DVDs, taken 
from online retailer Amazon.de, which appeared in five sets of randomized pairs. Therefore, 
the pretest consisted of 45 different DVD combinations. For each pair of DVDs, participants 
chose which they would rather buy and described the attributes they evaluated for each decision 
in a free response format. The procedure was then repeated for five pairs of pocket calculators. 4 
On average and per participant, 9.33 discrete attributes were elicited across the five 
choice sets in the DVD pre-test, and 11.41 discrete attributes were elicited across the five 
choice sets in the calculator pre-test. The attributes listed by the respondents were grouped and 
tabulated on the basis of the total frequency with which they were mentioned, then the 
frequency distribution was plotted on a log-scale chart (similar to the scree plot approach in 
                                                 
4
  The list and descriptions of the 10 DVDs and 10 pocket calculators are available from the authors upon request. 
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cluster analysis). This plot, listing all elicited attributes, is shown in Figure 1. For both the 
DVDs and the pocket calculators, the frequency distribution curve dropped sharply after the 
eighth attribute. This suggests that, when asked to introspect on their decision,  the majority of 
participants considered these eight attributes to have influenced their choice, whereas the 
remaining attributes appear to have been salient only for a minority of participants and choices. 
Thus, the eight most frequently listed attributes per product were retained as the salient 
attributes for the experiment.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 approx. here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Experimental Procedure  
Three-hundred thirty-four students were recruited on the campus of a German university as 
potential participants for the main experiment. After eliminating incomplete responses and 
participants who had already seen the movie that was used as the stimulus in the hedonic 
condition, the final data set contains 308 complete cases (55.3% female).  
The participants were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions. The stimulus 
in the hedonic condition was the motion picture DVD Stay (USA 2006, directed by Marc 
Foster, starring Ewan McGregor, Ryan Gosling, and Naomi Watts), and the stimulus in the 
utilitarian condition was a pocket calculator, the Sharp EL-W531H. Both stimuli could be 
purchased at the time of the experiment from online retailers for approximately €10. The 
participants entered separate rooms that contained each condition’s respective stimulus and a 
paper-based survey for measuring the hypothesized constructs. After completing the 
questionnaire, they were directed into a second room, where an interviewer (the same person 
for both conditions and for all participants) offered them the chance to buy the DVD or 
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calculator, for a price of €4.99. The physical separation of the survey-based intention measures 
and measures of actual behavior makes it possible to reduce potential self-generated validity 
and interviewer compliance effects (Chandon, Morwitz, & Reinartz, 2005). The purchases were 
recorded as a binary measure of actual behavior. 29 of 146 (19.9%) participants in the hedonic 
condition and 14 of 163 (8.6%) participants in the utilitarian condition purchased the respective 
product.  
Manipulation Checks and Scale Validation 
To check the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation of hedonic value, the HED/UT 
scale developed by Voss and colleagues (2003) was used. As expected, the movie DVD scores 
significantly higher on the five-item HED subscale (4.69) than the calculator (3.07; F  (1, 308) 
= 139.25, p < .001; Cronbach .880). Likewise, the calculator scored significantly higher on 
the five-item UT subscale (5.13) than for the movie DVD (2.32; F  (1, 308) = 417.34, p < .001; 
Cronbach .927). Subsequently, only the HED subscale was used to evaluate the hedonic 
value of the stimuli. The attribute importance wi and evaluations ei were gathered for the eight 
attributes per stimulus, using the adequacy-importance formulation (Mazis et al., 1975). The 
attitude toward the object Aobj measure contains two items ( = .882), and purchase intention is 
a single item. All the items appear in the Appendix. 
In both temporal dimensions (anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations), the 
four emotion constructs (Positive Low Activation, Positive High Activation, Negative Low 
Activation, Negative High Activation5) were measured as reflective constructs with three to six 
items each, based on the emotions listed for each dimension in Larsen and Diener’s (1992) 
                                                 
5
 For the sake of brevity, the authors will refer to Positive Low Activation as “PosLoAct”, Positive High Activation 
as “PosHiAct”, Negative Low Activation as “NegLoAct”, and Negative High Activation and “NegHiAct”. 
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circumplex model. Cronbach alphas for the constructs range from .835 to .930. The 
discriminant validity between the emotion constructs was assessed with a confirmatory factor 
analysis (employing LISREL) of the eight emotion constructs (four emotion constructs in both 
anticipatory emotion and emotional expectation dimensions). Then, the χ² of a model in which 
constructs are allowed to correlate freely (χ² = 5772.96) was compared with several constrained 
models. Specifically, when constraining the correlation between any pair of anticipatory 
emotion constructs to 1, the chi-square increases significantly (all χ² differences > 528.89, df 
change = 1, p < .001). Similarly, when constraining any pair of emotional expectation 
constructs to unity, it was found that the chi-square also increases significantly (all χ² 
differences > 111.80, df change = 1, p < .001). It was thus concluded that within their temporal 
dimensions, anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations exhibit discriminant validity 
(Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991). The same conclusion emerges when pairs of anticipatory 
emotions and emotional expectations were constrained to unity, with the exception of two pairs 
that fail to exhibit discriminant validity as a result of their high correlation: anticipatory 
NegLoAct–anticipated NegLoAct and anticipatory NegHiAct–anticipated NegHiAct. This 
result may be explained by the finding that consumers are likely to infer their future (expected) 
emotions from their current (anticipatory) emotional experience (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). In 
the calculations, this was remedied by removing the effect of anticipatory emotions on 
emotional expectations through adjusted regressions, as described subsequently. The 
descriptive statistics and correlations appear in Table 2.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 approx. here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The data supports the use of four unipolar emotions instead of two bipolar dimensions. The 
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latter conceptualization would have required that emotions are mutually exclusive, so that the 
unipolar scales of PosHiAct versus NegLoAct (and PosLoAct versus NegHiAct) would have to 
correlate with close to -1. However, the actual correlations were r (anticipatory PosHiAct, 
anticipatory NegLoAct) =-.33, r (anticipatory PosLoAct, anticipatory NegHiAct) =-.37, r (expected 
PosHiAct, expected NegLoAct) =-.15 and r (expected PosLoAct, expected NegHiAct) =-.07, 
pointing to the existence of mixed emotions. This suggests that the emotion dimensions anchoring 
the bipolar scales are far from mutually exclusive. While having two emotion dimensions per time 
frame would be more parsimonious than having four, the four emotion constructs were employed 
due to the observed correlations and discriminant validity. 
Results for Hypothesis 1 
The hypotheses were tested with a series of adjusted multistage regression models that use the 
standardized residuals of the initial regression steps as independent variables in subsequent 
regression steps. This procedure decomposes effects in path analysis and makes it possible to 
estimate models that contain both linear and logistic relations among the variables, as is the 
case for the EVM outcomes of attitude, intentions, and actual purchase (Lance, 1988). In short, 
the purpose of calculating the residuals through multi-stage regressions is to test (1) the effect 
of emotions on attitude, (2) the effect of emotions on intentions that is not already contained in 
attitude, and (3) the effect of emotions on actual purchase behavior that is not already 
contained in either attitude or intention. Figure 2 shows the general augmented EVM 
framework, outlining which variables are exogenous and which are included as standardized 
residuals for each of the three regressands Aobj, PI, and AP.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




In the augmented EVM models, linear regressions of each expected PosLoAct, 
PosHiAct, NegLoAct, and NegHiAct emotion on its anticipatory counterpart were first run and 
the standardized residuals were saved. This approach removes any effect of anticipatory 
emotions on emotional expectations from subsequent regressions that involve both temporal 
emotion dimensions. To test H1a, Aobj was regressed on the adequacy-importance score, 
anticipatory emotion, and the emotional expectation residuals, and then compared with the 
“traditional” EVM model in which Aobj is regressed only on the adequacy-importance model. 
For support, H1a would require a significant increase in R2. The traditional EVM model attains 
an R² of .443, and the model that includes the emotion constructs produces an R² of .586 for 
Aobj (see Table 3). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 approx. here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
As the augmented model uses more information, it must be determined whether this 
increase in variance explanation is trivial. However, because the R² difference of .143 
(F(8,308) = 12.823, p < .001) between the two models which balances variance explanation 
against the amount of used information is significant, it can be claimed that the inclusion of 
anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations significantly improves the prediction of Aobj, 
in support of H1a. However, though the adequacy-importance model and all four anticipatory 
emotion constructs directly influence Aobj as expected, none of the emotional expectation 
dimension residuals has a significant effect. When separate regressions for the hedonic 
condition and utilitarian condition subsamples were conducted, H1a holds true in both the 
hedonic condition (traditional EVM R² =  .529, augmented EVM R² =  .663, R² difference = 
.134, F (8,146) = 6.66, p < .001) and the utilitarian condition (traditional EVM R² =  .411, 
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augmented EVM R² =  .566, R² difference = .155, F  (8,162) = 6.78, p < .001). In the hedonic 
condition, anticipatory PosHiAct and anticipatory NegLoAct are significant at p < .01, and 
expected PosHiAct is significant at p < .05. In the utilitarian condition, on the other hand, 
anticipatory PosLoAct and anticipatory NegHiAct are significant at p < .01, and anticipatory 
PosHiAct is significant at p < .05. The adequacy-importance score is significant at p < .001 in 
both subsamples. That is, counter to the prediction, including emotion measures significantly 
improves the prediction of Aobj for not only hedonic products but also utilitarian objects. 
To test H1b, each anticipatory emotion dimension and the residuals of each emotional 
expectation dimension was linearly regressed on Aobj and the standardized residuals were saved. 
Consistent with the objectives of this research, this was done to obtain the incremental effect of 
anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations on the subsequent outcome variables 
purchase intentions (PI) and actual purchase (AP), i.e. the effect not already included in Aobj6. 
Then, the augmented EVM model was calculated as the regression of PI on Aobj and the 
residuals of anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations. Table 3 lists the results; for the 
augmented EVM model, R² reaches .488, compared with an R² of .439 for the traditional EVM 
model in which PI are regressed on Aobj only. The R² difference of .049 (F(8,308) = 3.55, p < 
.01) is again significant, in line with H1b. Similar to when attitudes are the dependent variable, 
regarding influencers of purchase intention, anticipatory NegLoAct, expected PosHiAct, and 
expected NegLoAct are significant, whereas the other emotions are not. H1b receives support 
for both hedonic (traditional EVM R² =  .560, augmented EVM R² =  .629, R² difference = .069, 
F (8,146) = 3.16, p < .01) and utilitarian (traditional EVM R² =  .356, augmented EVM R² =  
                                                 
6
  Please note that the direction of this regression, from Aobj to anticipatory emotion and the emotional expectation 
residuals, does not imply that the theoretical and causal relationship between these variables is suddenly 
reversed. Instead, the purpose is to partial out from anticipatory emotion and the emotional expectation 
residuals the variance explanation of PI that is already contained in Aobj. 
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.429, R² difference = .073, F (8,162) = 2.45, p < .05) conditions. In the former, anticipatory 
PosLoAct is significant, in addition to the emotions that are significant in the full sample 
analysis, whereas in the latter condition, only expected PosHiAct and expected NegLoAct are 
significant at p < .10. 
To test H1c, each expected emotion was regressed on its anticipatory emotion 
counterpart and the residuals were saved. Next, each anticipatory emotion and each expected 
emotion residual were regressed on Aobj and PI and the residuals were saved to obtain the 
effects of anticipatory emotions and expected emotions on actual purchase (AP) that are not 
already contained in Aobj and PI. Then, Aobj was regressed on PI and the residuals were saved to 
capture the direct effect of Aobj on AP  that is not already contained in PI. As a fourth and final 
step, a logistic regression of AP  on PI, the Aobj residuals, and the residuals of anticipatory and 
expected emotion was run. For the traditional EVM model, a logistic regression of AP  on PI 
and the Aobj residuals (saved from the regression of Aobj on PI) was calculated.  
The results are also included in Table 3. For the augmented EVM model, a Nagelkerke 
R² of .438 (-2LL = 163.383) was obtained; only anticipatory NegLoAct directly influences AP . 
In the case of the traditional EVM model, the Nagelkerke R² is only .390 (-2LL = 173.994), but 
the likelihood ratio test (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2004) indicates that the -2LL difference is not 
significant (χ² = 10.61, df = 8, p = .225). Therefore, predictions of actual purchase do not 
improve significantly when anticipatory and expected emotion constructs were included, and 
H1c must be rejected. The same result occurs for both the hedonic and utilitarian condition 
subsamples. 
Results for Hypothesis 2 
To test H2, it was calculated whether the effects of the anticipatory and expected emotion 
variables on Aobj, PI, and AP  in the three augmented EVM models may be moderated by the 
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hedonic versus utilitarian conditions. To do so, the residual-centering procedure introduced by 
Lance (1988) was employed. For H2a, an interaction term was created first for each 
anticipatory emotion and each residual of the expected-on-anticipatory emotion regressions by 
multiplying the respective values with the binary condition (i.e., hedonic = 1, utilitarian = 0). 
Then, each interaction term was regressed on its two main effects, that is, the anticipatory 
emotion (expected emotion residual) and the hedonic (utilitarian) condition. The resulting 
residuals were used alongside the other independent variables and the main effects from the 
augmented EVM regression model, with Aobj as the outcome variable.  
The results, reported in Table 4, uncover three significant interaction residual terms: 
anticipatory PosHiAct ×  condition ( = .093, p < .05), anticipatory NegLoAct ×  condition ( = -
.116, p < .05), and anticipatory PosLoAct ×  condition ( = -.092, p < .05). Because interaction 
effects represent the estimated change in the slope of Y on X1, given a one-unit change in X2 
(Jaccard, Wan, & Turrisi, 1980), this means that anticipatory PosHiAct emotion (i.e. 
enthusiasm, elation, excitement) has a stronger positive effect, and its opposing dimension of 
anticipatory NegLoAct emotion (i.e. boredom, sluggishness, dullness) has a stronger negative 
effect on Aobj when the product is hedonic, in partial support of H2a. However, the positive 
effect of anticipatory PosLoAct emotions (i.e. relaxation, contentedness, serenity) on Aobj 
becomes weaker when the product is hedonic though, which partially contradicts H2a.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 approx. here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
For the tests of H2b and H2c, interaction terms were analogously created by multiplying 
the residuals of each anticipatory and expected emotion contained in the augmented EVM 
models with the binary hedonic versus utilitarian condition, then regressed the interaction terms 
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on the main effects to obtain the interaction residuals. Next, they were added to the respective 
augmented EVM model. In the linear regression with PI as the dependent variable, a significant 
anticipatory PosHiAct ×  condition interaction ( = .088, p < .05) was found, which indicates that 
the direct effect of enthusiasm, elation, and excitement on PI (which is not mediated through 
Aobj) becomes stronger when the product is hedonic, in support of H2b (see Table 4). However, 
none of the other anticipatory emotion residual (expected emotion residual) ×  condition 
interactions is significant. In the augmented EVM logistic regression with actual purchase as 
the outcome variable, no significant interaction residual term was found, which fails to provide 
support for H2c. Overall, support for H2 is limited, in that H2c must be fully rejected and, 
regarding H2a and H2b, that some but not all anticipatory emotions become more important to 
the decision-making process when the product is hedonic. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This is the first study that attempts to broaden the EVM by integrating it with a dimensional theory 
of emotion and tests the effects of emotions on three stages of decision-making: attitude formation, 
intention formation, and behavior. This research also accounts empirically for the distinction 
between anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations, an issue rarely addressed by extant 
research, and it joins various strands of emotion research by testing the moderating effects of 
hedonic value in this setting. 
Our findings have implications both for marketing scholars and practitioners. In general, 
the results show that augmented EVM models explain significantly more variance of Aobj than 
does the traditional EVM, because several anticipatory emotion and emotional expectation 
constructs have strong direct effects on Aobj that are not captured by assessing product attribute 
evaluations and attribute importance (i.e., the adequacy-importance model of attitude). 
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Similarly, the prediction of purchase intentions can be improved significantly by the inclusion 
of the direct effects of anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations that are not already 
contained in Aobj, as was demonstrated through the adjusted regressions approach. This is 
consistent with earlier findings (Kulviwat et al., 2007) which demonstrate that variance 
explanation attitudes and intentions in the Technology Acceptance Model, which has the same 
roots as the EVM, can be improved by augmenting it with a dimensional model of emotion. It 
is interesting to note that this study’s findings hold for both hedonic and utilitarian conditions, 
which indicates that predictions of both global attitudes and purchase intentions for extremely 
utilitarian products, such as pocket calculators, can be enhanced by accounting for emotions.  
This appears to run counter to Pham’s (1998) findings which show that emotions play a more 
important role for hedonic (“consummatory”) than for utilitarian (“instrumental”) consumption 
episodes. The disparity may be explained by an important difference between Pham’s and the 
present study. While the present research experiment used a product genuinely perceived as 
utilitarian (i.e. a pocket calculator), Pham merely gave participants a utilitarian motive for 
consuming a hedonic product (i.e. watching a movie in order to be able to write a better t erm 
paper essay and win prize money). Thus, in Pham’s study, the relevance of emotional responses 
to the prospect of watching a movie was diminished by introducing the utilitarian (and 
extrinsic) motive, thus reducing the reliance on emotions in the consumption decision. In the 
present research study, participants appear to have viewed emotions elicited by the pocket 
calculator as both representative and relevant to their decision – for example, they may have 
wished to avoid feeling anxious and annoyed about it when having to rely on it during an 
important exam. Thus, just because a product is utilitarian, one should not assume that the 
emotions it elicits are automatically being viewed as irrelevant to the consumption decision.  
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An analysis of the subsamples also reveals that anticipatory emotions (vs. emotional 
expectations) play a relatively bigger role in the hedonic condition (vs. the utilitarian 
condition). This finding may be explained by the theoretical difference between anticipatory 
emotions and emotional expectations: The latter are phenomenologically closer in nature to 
cognitive expectations, whereas the former are truly experienced emotions. When evaluating 
emotion-related hedonic products, the aforementioned representativeness heuristic (Pham, 
1998) may therefore explain why anticipatory emotions are weighted more heavily in hedonic 
consumption decisions than emotional expectations.  
The prediction of actual purchases, however, cannot be improved significantly by 
adding anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations as predictors. Evidently, the further 
one moves along the decision-making stages, the weaker are the direct effects of emotion 
because an increasing amount of variance is captured by the traditional EVM variables due to 
the adjusted regressions. Yet emotions indirectly influence PI through mediation by Aobj and 
AP  through mediation by Aobj and PI. It was also found that anticipatory emotions and 
emotional expectations can be empirically distinguished, and that they influence consumer 
decision making at different stages. As conjectured, currently experienced (anticipatory) 
emotions have a stronger effect on Aobj, whereas expected future (expected) emotions have a 
stronger effect on PI, quite possibly due to their shared temporal anchor. 
It may be argued that the relationship between anticipatory emotions and emotional 
expectations is the inverse of what is assumed in this research, i.e. emotional expectations 
guiding the formation of anticipatory emotion. For example, anticipating the negative emotions 
associated with visiting the dentist in the future may make one feel dreadful at the moment. Or 
anticipating the positive emotions, e.g. elation/excitement, from the upcoming vacation may lead 
one to feel excited and elated right now. An alternative set of regression models (not reported in 
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detail in the manuscript) was run incorporating this inverse relationship.7 As would be expected 
due to the adjusted regression methodology, reversing the causal relationship between 
anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations does not influence the R² or Nagelkerke R² of 
the Augmented EVM models, and therefore has no effect on the confirmation or 
disconfirmation of hypotheses. What happens, however, is that the effects of emotional 
expectations generally increase, whereas the effects of anticipatory emotions generally decrease 
(this shift is most pronounced when AObj is the dependent variable, and less so when PI and AP  
are the dependent variables). Again, this is a result of the methodology, which reassigns 
variance explanation to emotional expectations that was previously attributed to anticipatory 
emotions. This also means that the interpretation of the relative effects strengths of anticipatory 
emotions versus emotional expectations is influenced by the theoretical perspective taken. If 
one assumes that anticipatory emotion guides emotional expectation (as originally argued in 
this research), and thus removes from emotional expectation all variance explanation already 
contained in anticipatory emotion, then the effects of anticipatory emotions will grow stronger 
relative to emotional expectations, and vice versa.  
In terms of the emotion circumplex model, this research shows that the emotional axis of 
boredom/dullness versus excitement/elation is weighted more heavily during the formation of 
Aobj when the product is hedonic rather than utilitarian. This effect decreases when PI 
represents the dependent variable, and it disappears when AP  is the dependent variable. It is 
also conceivable that the choice of hedonic stimulus, a motion picture DVD, may have 
contributed to the higher weighting of the PosHiAct/NegLoAct dimension. For different types 
of hedonic consumption experiences, e.g. a massage, the PosLoAct dimension (relaxation, 
contentment, serenity) may be a better predictor.  
                                                 
7
  Detailed information on this additional analysis is provided by the authors upon request. 
26 
 
For marketing practitioners, this study’s results highlight the need to take emotional 
responses into account when using expectancy-value models to predict consumers’ brand 
attitudes and purchasing intentions. Examples abound of manufacturers, marketers, and 
marketing scholars having relied on expectancy-value models to inform product design 
decisions (Watkins, 2008) and predict attitudes and purchasing intentions towards utilitarian 
and hedonic products (online banking - Yousafzai, Foxall, & Pallister, 2010; tourism, local 
cuisine - Ryu & Han, 2010; games versus grammar checking software – Kempf, 1999). As 
Kempf (1999) argues, in all of these settings, practitioners can benefit from being able to 
predict which category of responses – attribute evaluations versus emotions – will be most 
important to attitudes, purchasing intentions, and choice. A more precise understanding of 
brand attitude determinants, as provided by the augmented expectancy-value model, can be 
used by marketers to tweak product feature sets prior to manufacturing, improve their 
understanding of the competitive landscape, and optimize product positioning for both 
functional and emotional qualities. This study’s results demonstrate that these benefits are not 
only available to marketers of hedonic products, but also to marketers of utilitarian products 
where emotional responses have traditionally been viewed as irrelevant to consumer decis ion 
making. They show that just because a product or service fulfils a mainly utilitarian purpose, 
emotional responses cannot be safely ignored when studying attitude formation and purchase 
intentions. Instead, researchers and practitioners should consider whether emotional responses 
can conceivably be viewed as both representative and relevant to the target object; the answer 
may be “yes” even for many products heretofore considered purely utilitarian.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
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This study contains several limitations. First, by focusing on the expectancy-value model of 
attitude, the authors do not control for another component of Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) 
theory of reasoned action, namely, subjective norms. This construct accounts for the normative 
beliefs of a person’s significant others, as well as the person’s motivation to comply with these 
beliefs. In the theory of reasoned action, it is modeled to have a direct effect on intentions, 
parallel to (and independent of) Aobj. There is little doubt about the power of subjective norms 
in most settings studied by social psychologists, yet their role in purchasing decisions for every 
day consumer goods appears more equivocal. At least five recent empirical studies based on the 
theory of reasoned action find no effect of subjective norms on purchase intentions or purchase 
behavior (Bosnjak, Obermeier, & Tuten, 2006; Helmig, Huber, & Leeflang, 2007; Hsu, Wang, 
& Wen, 2006; Njite & Parsa, 2005; Wang, Chen, Chang, & Yang, 2007). Similarly, the 
purchase of the pocket calculator or DVD in this study is not likely to engender strong approval 
or disapproval by participants’ significant others, so subjective norms should not have biased 
the results. Nevertheless, accounting for subjective norms in further studies might prove 
instructive; it would be particularly interesting to examine the interplay between emotions and 
subjective norms in determining Aobj and intentions.  
Second, Ajzen’s (1991) extension of the theory of reasoned action, the theory  of planned 
behavior, is ignored, which adds perceived behavioral control as an antecedent of intentions, 
alongside Aobj and subjective norms. Perceived behavioral control captures the perceived ease 
or difficulty associated with performing the behavior in question. In the context of this 
research, it is reasonable to assume that the participants did not associate any particular 
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difficulty with the act of purchasing a simple consumer good for €4.99 and that the behavior 
was within their locus of control.8 
Third, as with any study that relies on survey-based (self-reported) measures of emotion, 
the measurement method might have introduced distortions by prompting respondents to 
introspect on, cognitively process, and report on their emotional states. Thus , latent and 
unconscious processes that otherwise would not have been salient or active during “normal” 
decision making might have become salient or activated. Conversely, respondents might not 
have been able to cognitively access their latent and unconscious emotional states, which would 
prevent their accurate reports. Therefore, though the survey-based emotion measures exhibit 
both internal and external validity, it could prove instructive to combine them with alternative, 
non–self-reported measures in additional studies. For example, physiological measures such as 
skin conduction resistance, blood pressure, pupil dilation, or heart rate could capture the 
activation dimension of emotion. However, there is great difficulty in using such autonomic 
nervous system measures to distinguish responses along the pleasantness dimension (Levenson, 
1992). Modern brain imaging techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), may be used to observe the activation of brain areas generally associated with pleasure 
and arousal, but these techniques, too, highly depend on subjective interpretations by the 
researcher. Moreover, physiological and neurological measures are physically intrusive (i.e., 
electrodes applied to the respondents’ skin or head, eye monitoring devices) or require 
extremely noisy machinery and claustrophobic environments. They therefore introduce their 
own set of problems and distortions. For decision-making studies such as this one, the most 
practical and unobtrusive external measure of emotion may be facial action coding. To apply 
                                                 
8
  If participant had no cash but stated an interest in purchasing the product, the researchers allowed him or her to return 
later to pay and pick up the product. 
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the faction action coding system (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978), participants would have to 
be filmed during the choice experiment, and specifically trained judges would then 
independently analyze and code the participants’ facial expressions into the emotional states 
they believed the participants had experienced during the experiment.  
The above limitations notwithstanding and without taking anything away from all 
research subsequent to the emergence of the expectancy-value model, it appears that for many 
practical situations the EVM with its simplicity may suffice. In this sense, a resurrection of the 
utility of the EVM in the literature seems in order. However, whether a researcher or 
practitioner should augment the expectancy-value model with anticipatory emotion and 
emotional expectation constructs depends on the trade-offs he or she is willing to make, as well 
as the stage of decision making under investigation. For some practical purposes, especially 
when the antecedents of overall attitude formation are not of interest, traditional EVM is more 
parsimonious and easier to handle. On the other hand, the additional variance explanation 
offered by anticipatory emotions and emotional expectations is huge for Aobj, considerable and 
significant for PI, but only marginal for AP. Thus, for researchers and marketing practitioners 
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Scree Plot of Attribute Importance for Experimental Stimuli 































Expectations Regressions using standardized 






 Unpleasant Affect Pleasant Affect 
High Activation “Negative High Activated (NegHiAct)”: Distressed, annoyed, fearful, sad 
“Positive High Activated (PosHiAct)”: 
Enthusiastic, elated, excited 
Low Activation “Negative Low Activated (NegLoAct)”:  Bored, sluggish, dull 
“Positive Low Activated (PosLoAct)”: 
Relaxed, content, serene 
 







Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Construct Ma SDa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) c 
1 HED Score 3.83 1.45 .88             
2 Adequacy-
Importanceb 
191.40 52.47 .33 n.a.            
3 Ay PosLoAct 3.37 1.51 .16 .21 .93           
4 Ay PosHiAct 2.80 1.42 .61 .49 .18 .92          
5 Ay NegLoAct 2.43 1.37 -.40 -.30 -.11 -.33 .87         
6 Ay NegHiAct 2.29 1.18 -.09 -.20 -.37 -.14 .43 .90        
7 Exp PosLoAct 3.71 1.62 -.06 .24 .57 .11 .03 -.19 .93       
8 Exp PosHiAct 2.78 1.43 .49 .35 .12 .70 -.23 .00 .16 .91      
9 Exp NegLoAct 2.02 1.02 -.04 -.21 -.25 -.13 .39 .74 -.30 -.07 .84     
10 Exp NegHiAct 2.45 1.36 -.23 -.37 -.16 -.26 .63 .51 -.15 -.18 .60 .89    
11 AObj 4.31 1.53 .55 .67 .30 .57 -.42 -.34 .24 .44 -.30 -.41 .88   
12 Purchase 
Intention 
4.36 1.96 .31 .52 .18 .39 -.37 -.26 .22 .37 -.32 -.45 .66 n.a.  
13 Actual 
Purchasec 
0.14 0.35 .31 .25 .02 .27 -.23 -.10 .02 .23 -.13 -.21 .33 .40 n.a. 
 
Notes: Numbers on the diagonal are Cronbach’s alpha scores; n.a. = no alpha score calculated because the construct is 
measured by a formative scale or single item. All correlations r  |.15| are significant at the level of .01 (two-tailed), and 
all correlations |.11|   r   |.14| are significant at the level of .05 (two-tailed). 
 
a
 Means and standard deviations are calculated for the average of construct items.  
b Means and standard deviations are calculated for the product of attribute importance (i1-8) and attribute evaluation (e1-8). 
c






Path Coefficients of Traditional EVM versus Augmented EVM, n=308 
 H1a (linear regression) H1b (linear regression) H1c (logistic regression) 













.665 .000 .443 AObj .662 .000 .439 AObj residualsd .374 .097 .390 (173.944) 











=  12.823, 
p <  .001 






=  4.363, 
p= .001 
AObj residualsd .387 .090 
.438 (163.383) 
 
-2LL diff.:  
10.611,  
diff. in df =  8,  
p =  .225 
Ay PosLoAct .102 .014 Ay PosLoAct 
residualsb 
-.020 .652 PI 1.553 .000 
Ay PosHiAct .279 .000 Ay PosHiAct 
residualsb 
.004 .917 Ay PosLoAct 
residualse 
-.322 .122 
Ay NegLoAct -.144 .002 Ay NegLoAct 
residualsb 
-.117 .014 Ay PosHiAct 
residualse 
.135 .457 
Ay NegHiAct -.111 .024 Ay NegHiAct 
residualsb 





.027 .516 Exp PosLoAct 
residualsc 





.060 .119 Exp PosHiAct 
residualsc 





-.012 .790 Exp NegLoAct 
residualsc 





.001 .984 Exp NegHiAct 
residualsc 
-.044 .351 Exp NegLoAct 
residualsf 
.031 .916 




Notes: Due to the adjusted regression procedure, there are no problems of multicollinearity (all variance inflation factors   1.71). 
a
 Standardized residuals of regressing each emotional expectation on the corresponding anticipatory emotion (e.g., expected PosLoAct on anticipatory PosLoAct).  
b
 Standardized residuals of regressing each anticipatory emotion on AObj. 
c
 Standardized residuals of regressing the residuals obtained in a on AObj. 
d
 Standardized residuals of regressing AObj on PI. 
e
 Standardized residuals of regressing each anticipatory emotion on AObj and PI. 
f




Moderator Effects of Hedonic Condition in Augmented EVM, n=308 
H2a (linear regression) H2b (linear regression) H2c (logistic regression) 
Regressing AObj on:  p-
value 
R² Regressing PI on:  p-
value 




Adequacy-Importance .410 .000 
.617 
AObj .645 .000 
.525 
AObj residualse .206 .447 
.508 
Ay PosLoAct .146 .001 Ay PosLoAct residualsc -.023 .609 PI 2.026 .000 
Ay PosHiAct .251 .000 Ay PosHiAct residualsc .029 .507 Ay PosLoAct residualsf -.116 .660 
Ay NegLoAct -.112 .020 Ay NegLoAct residualsc -.120 .014 Ay PosHiAct residualsf -.138 .505 
Ay NegHiAct -.143 .004 Ay NegHiAct residualsc -.007 .891 Ay NegLoAct residualsf -.304 .401 
Exp PosLoAct residualsa .027 .531 Exp PosLoAct residualsc .016 .744 Ay NegHiAct residualsf -.528 .227 
Exp PosHiAct residualsa .077 .042 Exp PosHiAct residualsc .122 .004 Exp PosLoAct residualsf .244 .419 
Exp NegLoAct residualsa .004 .933 Exp NegLoAct residualsc -.139 .004 Exp PosHiAct residualsf .190 .395 
Exp NegHiAct residualsa -.071 .696 Exp NegHiAct residualsc -.050 .296 Exp NegLoAct residualsf .366 .285 
HED/UT Condition (binary) .058 .192 HED/UT Condition (binary) -.105 .027 Exp NegHiAct residualsf -.633 .148 
Ay PosLoAct-Cond. Int.res. b -.092 .027 Ay PosLoAct res.-Cond. Int.res. d -.036 .436 HED/UT Condition (binary) 2.416 .001 
Ay PosHiAct-Cond. Int.res. b .093 .021 Ay PosHiAct res.-Cond. Int.res. d .088 .035 Ay PosLoAct res.-Cond. Int.res. g -.069 .796 
Ay NegLoAct-Cond. Int.res. b -.116 .014 Ay NegLoAct res.-Cond. Int.res. d -.015 .761 Ay PosHiAct res.-Cond. Int.res. g -.080 .678 
Ay NegHiAct-Cond. Int.res. b .051 .288 Ay NegHiAct res.-Cond. Int.res. d .055 .295 Ay NegLoAct res.-Cond. Int.res. g .007 .982 
Exp PosLoAct-Cond. Int.res. b -.028 .492 Exp PosLoAct res.-Cond. Int.res. d -.047 .291 Ay NegHiAct res.-Cond. Int.res. g .230 .530 
Exp PosHiAct-Cond. Int.res. b .039 .302 Exp PosHiAct res.-Cond. Int.res. d .010 .807 Exp PosLoAct res.-Cond. Int.res. g -.255 .409 
Exp NegLoAct-Cond. Int.res. b .008 .855 Exp NegLoAct res.-Cond. Int.res. d -.041 .393 Exp PosHiAct res.-Cond. Int.res. g -.309 .168 
Exp NegHiAct-Cond. Int.res. b .018 .679 Exp NegHiAct res.-Cond. Int.res. d .079 .093 Exp NegLoAct res.-Cond. Int.res. g -.110 .740 
      Exp NegHiAct res.-Cond. Int.res. g .413 .307 
 
a
 Standardized residuals of regressing each emotional expectation on the corresponding anticipatory emotion (e.g., expected PosLoAct on anticipatory PosLoAct).  
b
 Standardized residuals of regressing each HED condition × anticipatory emotion  (HED condition × emotional expectation residual obtained in a) interaction term 
on its main effects. 
c
 Standardized residuals of regressing each anticipatory emotion (each emotional expectation residual obtained in a) on AObj. 
d
 Standardized residuals of regressing each HED Condition × anticipatory emotion residual obtained in c (HED condition × emotional expectation residual obtained 
in c) interaction term on its main effects. 
e
 Standardized residuals of regressing AObj on PI. 
f
 Standardized residuals of regressing each anticipatory emotion (each emotional expectation residual obtained in a) on AObj and PI. 
g
 Standardized residuals of regressing each HED condition × anticipatory emotion residual obtained in f (HED condition × emotional expectation residual obtained 




List of Items 
 
Construct Measurement Scale 
Hedonic value “The DVD “Stay”/ the Sharp WriteView pocket calculator… 
…is fun/ exciting/ tempting/ thrilling/ entertaining” 
Ordinal seven-point scale,  
“not at all” - “completely” 
Attribute 
importance wi  
“When you’re buying a DVD/ a pocket calculator, how important 
are the following attributes to you?” 
Story/ actors/ price of the DVD/ genre/ cover design/ DVD bonus 
material/ director/ title of the movie (DVD); Number of functions/ 
price/ design/ brand/ quality of the display/ ease of use/ energy 
source/ overall size (Pocket calculator) 
Ordinal seven-point scale,  




“And how would you rate the DVD “Stay“/ the Sharp WriteView 
pocket calculator on these attributes?” - See attribute list above 
Ordinal seven-point scale,  





…I think the DVD “Stay”/ the Sharp WriteView pocket 
calculator is good 
…I like the DVD “Stay”/ the Sharp WriteView pocket 
calculator” 
Ordinal seven-point scale,  
“not at all” - “completely” 
Purchase 
Intention 
“If you were offered to buy the DVD “Stay”/ the Sharp WriteView 
pocket calculator for €4.99: Would you buy it?” 
Ordinal seven-point scale,  







“Please close your eyes for a moment and imagine seeing the movie 
“Stay”/ using the Sharp WriteView pocket calculator. Then please 
describe what you are feeling right now: 
When I imagine seeing the movie “Stay”/ using the Sharp 
WriteView pocket calculator, I feel…  
…relaxed/ content/ calm (anticipatory PosLoAct); enthusiastic/ 
elated/ excited (anticipatory PosHiAct); bored/ dull/ sluggish 
(anticipatory NegLoAct); sad/ depressed/ nervous/ anxious/ 
annoyed/ angry (anticipatory NegHiAct)” 
Ordinal seven-point scale,  






“Now please imagine you had already purchased the DVD “Stay” 
and had watched it/ had already purchased the Sharp WriteView 
pocket calculator and were using it regularly. How would you feel 
after watching the movie/ after purchasing the pocket calculator and 
when using it regularly?.  
After watching the movie “Stay”/ after purchasing the Sharp 
WriteView calculator and when using it regularly, I would feel… 
(see emotion item list) 
Ordinal seven-point scale,  
“not at all” - “completely” 
 
